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Available online xxxxStrong correlations between measures of ﬂuid intelligence (or Spearman's g) and working memory are widely
reported in the literature, but there is considerable controversy concerning the nature of underlyingmechanisms
driving this relationship. In the four experiments presented here we consider the role of response conﬂict and
task complexity in the context of real-time task execution demands (Experiments 1–3) and also address recent
evidence that g confers an advantage at the level of task conceptualisation rather than (or in addition to) task ex-
ecution (Experiment 4). We observed increased sensitivity of measured ﬂuid intelligence to task performance in
the presence (vs. the absence) of response conﬂict, and this relationship remainedwhen task complexity was re-
duced. Performance-g correlations were also observed in the absence of response conﬂict, but only in the context
of high task complexity. Further, we present evidence that differences in conceptualisation or ‘modelling’ of task
instructions prior to execution had an important mediating effect on observed correlations, but only when the
task encompassed a strong element of response inhibition. Our results suggest that individual differences in abil-
ity reﬂect, in large part, variability in the efﬁciency with which the relational complexity of task constraints are
held in mind. It follows that ﬂuid intelligence may support successful task execution through the construction
of effective action plans via optimal allocation of limited resources.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Keywords:
Spearman's g
Fluid intelligence
Response inhibition
Task complexity
Task modelling
Chunking1. Introduction
Strong correlations between performance on tests of workingmem-
ory capacity (WMC) and ﬂuid intelligence (g) are well established
(e.g., Ackerman, Beier, & Boyle, 2002; Conway, Cowan, Bunting,
Therriault, & Minkoff, 2002; Süß, Oberauer, Wittmann, Wilhelm, &
Schulze, 2002; Unsworth, Redick, Lakey, & Young, 2010). Themediating
factors in this relationship, however, are not fully understood. Tradition-
ally, theworkingmemory (WM) systemhas beenpresented as amental
workspace associated with the concurrent storage and processing of in-
formation; Baddeley and Hitch's (1974) multicomponent WM model,
for example, comprises domain-speciﬁc storage buffers and a central
executive. Complex span tests, which typically assess memory for
words or digits in the face of a demanding interleaved task are among
the best measures of WMC and are also sensitive to variations in ﬂuid
intelligence. In contrast, simple span tests, which do not encompass ad-
ditional processing demands, are typically weakly correlated withmea-
sures of WMC and intelligence (e.g., Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003;
Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway,linical Medicine, University of
ambridge CB2 0QQ, UK.
. This is an open access article under1999; Turner & Engle, 1989). This ﬁnding has led some authors to
argue for the central role of processing (e.g., executive attention;
Conway et al., 2003; Engle et al., 1999) in driving the correlation be-
tweenWMC and g. Subsequent evidence, however, supports the central
role of short-term storage (e.g., immediate recall of memory for num-
bers, letters, or visual arrays; Chuderski, Taraday, Nęcka, & Smoleń,
2012; Colom, Abad, Quiroga, Shih & Flores-Mendoza, 2008; Colom,
Flores-Mendoza, Quiroga, & Privado, 2005).
The executive attention account of inter-individual differences in
WMC (e.g., Engle & Kane, 2004; Kane, Conway, Hambrick, & Engle,
2007) claims that individuals with lowWMC have relatively limited ca-
pacity for controlling goal-directed attention, and for resolving response
conﬂict, compared to individuals with high WMC. According to this
view, high WMC individuals typically produce fewer errors on tasks
such as the classic Stroop (1935) test (e.g., Kane & Engle, 2003; Long &
Prat, 2002) because they possess relatively greater capacity for directing
attention to naming the colour, and for resolving the competition be-
tween eliciting the prepotent (but incorrect) response of reading the
word and producing the appropriate response of naming the colour in
which the word is written. On the basis of this executive attention ac-
count the memory maintenance and retrieval theory of WMC has
been developed (e.g., Unsworth & Engle, 2007a, 2007b; Unsworth &
Spillers, 2010) which claims that high WMC individuals are better at
both maintaining relevant information in primary (working) memory,the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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ondary (long-term) memory when required. Other researchers stress
that response inhibition is the singlemost important factor in individual
differences inWMC (Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Lustig, May &Hasher, 2001;
May, Hasher, & Kane, 1999). The claim is that individuals with high
WMC are better at restricting WM access to task-relevant information,
resolving response conﬂict, and inhibiting dominant but inappropriate
responses. High WMC individuals therefore perform better on the
Stroop because they are better able to limit WM access to the relevant
task component (naming the colour) and at inhibiting the dominant
but inappropriate tendency to name the word. In the context of the
maintenance and retrieval view, this theory would also explain how
conﬂict is resolved between the inappropriate stimulus-response map-
ping of reading the word held in secondary memory and the relevant
but less prepotent mapping of stating the colour held in primary mem-
ory. The three accounts are not mutually exclusive and share overlap-
ping theoretical claims, but they also incorporate distinct and testable
predictions (Redick, Calvo, Gay, & Engle, 2011) as outlined below.
Performance on the Stroop is usually considered to reﬂect capacity
for response inhibition and signiﬁcant correlations between perfor-
mance on the Stroop and psychometric intelligence have been reported
(e.g., Dempster, Corkill & Jacobi, 1995; Polderman et al., 2009; Salthouse,
Atkinson, & Berish, 2003). Functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) studies indicate that the anterior cingulate is recruited in condi-
tions of response conﬂict (Kerns et al., 2004), and by performance on
tasks with high g-loadings such as Raven's Advanced Progressive Matri-
ces (Gray, Chabris & Braver, 2003). Cognitive models of “general ability”
(e.g., Das, 2002) and prefrontal cortex (Roberts & Pennington, 1996)
also highlight the importance of inhibition in intelligence. Nevertheless,
studies based on factor analysis have produced inconsistent ﬁndings.
For example, Salthouse et al. (2003) report a strong relationship (r =
0.73) between their composite measures of inhibition and ﬂuid intelli-
gence in a large sample of adults (N = 261). Conversely, on the basis
of evidence suggesting that executive functions—speciﬁcally, inhibiting
prepotent responses, shifting between tasks/mental sets, and updating
the contents of WM—are correlated but separable (e.g., Miyake et al.,
2000; Miyake & Friedman, 2012), Friedman et al. (2006) observed that
their composite measures of inhibition (r = −0.11) and shifting
(r=−0.08) did not load signiﬁcantly onto their ﬂuid intelligence con-
struct whereas WM updating did (r= 0.74; WM updating was opera-
tionalized by tasks that required the adding and deleting of
information held in WM: keep-track, letter-memory, spatial 2-back).
Other studies have demonstrated that WMC is not related to the ability
to resist interference or dual-task coordination (e.g., Oberauer, Lange &
Engle, 2004). These ﬁndings indicate that the correlation between re-
sponse inhibition and intelligence is not straightforward, and therefore
that interaction with some other task component(s) may be of critical
importance in driving the relationship.
Redick et al. (2011) compared the executive attention, maintenance
and retrieval, and inhibition theories ofWMC in the context of go/no-go
task performance. The authors compared two go/no-go tasks – a simple
task involving a “go” response to one letter and a “no-go” response to all
other letters (with a reversemapping in another block), and a condition-
al task involving a go response to two letters conditional on the current
target being different to the last. Differences between individuals with
high/low WMC were observed only in the conditional task, such that
highWMC individuals performed better on both target trials (target let-
ters meeting the conditions for a go response) and lure trails (target let-
tersmeeting the conditions for a no-go response). Further, performance
was signiﬁcantly correlated with WMC in the conditional task only.
These ﬁndings were interpreted in the context of the maintenance
and retrieval account of WMC, with only the conditional task requiring
active monitoring and updating of stimulus-response mappings, and
the retrieval of the appropriate goal-relevant response. Redick et al.
(2011) argue that if inhibition or executive attentionwere fundamental
aspects of WMC, differences between individuals with high and lowspans would also be observed in the simple task, because a prepotent
response must be inhibited or response conﬂict resolved in both tasks.
An alternative view is that if attention is given to maintaining and
updating the stimulus-response mappings, reduced attention is avail-
able for resolving the conﬂict associated with the no-go requirement,
producing more error on these trials. Consistent with the notion of
shared but limited resource availability for processing and storage re-
quirements, research has shown that anti-saccade (Mitchell, Macrae, &
Gilchrist, 2002; Roberts, Hager, & Heron, 1994) and motor response in-
hibition (Hester & Garavan, 2005) capacities decline with increasing
WM load. Studies directly addressing storage versus processing ac-
counts of the driving force in inter-individual differences in the WMC–
g relationship emphasise the overarching importance of storage. For ex-
ample, Colom et al. (2008) claim that simple short-term storage
(i.e., memory for numbers/letters/visual arrays) accounts for a large
proportion of the relationship between WMC and g, and that although
attention control, WM updating, and mental speed are independently
correlated with g, these relationships disappear when short-term stor-
age is controlled for. In a related study, Chuderski et al. (2012) found
that their storage latent factor (comprising memory for visual arrays,
monitoring of relations among stimuli, and updating information in
WM) accounted for 70% of the variance in measured ﬂuid intelligence.
For their three processingmeasures, only attention control, and neither
resistance to interference nor response inhibition, was correlated with
ﬂuid intelligence (accounting for 25% of the variance in ﬂuid intelli-
gence), yet, when storage was controlled for, this correlation
disappeared.
A visual change detection study (Fukuda, Vogel, Mayr, & Awh, 2010)
has claimed that the number of representations that can be held inWM
is highly correlated with ﬂuid intelligence but that the resolution with
which stimulus representations are stored in WM is largely indepen-
dent. Nevertheless, observations by Duncan, Emslie, Williams,
Johnson, & Freer (1996) indicate that the relationship between ﬂuid in-
telligence and WM cannot be explained on the basis of a straightfor-
ward storage function. In their letter monitoring task, participants
were able to recall all task requirements after task completion, but the
sensitivity to ﬂuid intelligencewas explained by differences in the capa-
bility for responding appropriately to those requirements. Failure to
produce the appropriate response (referred to as “goal neglect”) was
largely restricted to participants scoring N 1 SD below the sample
mean on the Culture Fair test of ﬂuid intelligence (Cattell, 1971;
Cattell & Cattell, 1973).
Duncan et al. (2008) presented evidence that the efﬁciency with
which a task is cognitively modelled or held in mind may be of more
fundamental importance to the involvement of Spearman's g than the
real time processing demands associated with the task. Across a series
of computer based experiments, incorporating a variation of the task
presented here (Bright, 1998), the authors showed that the form in
which instructions were presented was the primary factor predicting
both the level of goal neglect and the size of correlation between goal
neglect and Spearman's g. Thus, although increased task complexity
did not increase the level of neglect of task demands, an additional
“dummy” requirement which had no impact on what participants
were required to do during actual task execution increased level of ne-
glect and the strength of the performance–g correlation. This pattern of
results has been replicated in children using a slightly simpliﬁed version
of this feature match task (Roberts & Anderson, 2014). On the basis of
their ﬁndings Duncan et al. (2008) claim that the ability to attend to a
complex “task model – a working memory description of the relevant
facts, rules, and requirements used to control current behaviour”
(p. 140) is fundamental to individual differences in g (see also
Bhandari & Duncan, 2014; Dumontheil, Thompson & Duncan, 2010;
Duncan, Schramm, Thompson, Dumontheil, 2012).
In the present study we explore the relationship between partici-
pants' effectivemodelling of task demands and Spearman's g in the con-
text of other candidate “risk factors” for the recruitment of g. In
Fig. 1. Representation of a typical RI Present trial in the colour-shape match task. Black,
mid grey, and light grey objects are presented in blue, red, and green, respectively. (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to
the web version of this article.)
Table 1
Deﬁnitions of performance measures.
Performance
measure
Deﬁnition
Critical error (RI
Present)
Response to double-matching (NO-GO) pair
Critical error (RI
Absent)
Missed ‘double’ (key press and verbal) response to
double-matching pair
Miss No response to single-matching (GO) pair
Hand error Response to incorrect side of single-matching pair
False positivek Response (key press) to non-matching (NEUTRAL) pair
False positivev (RI
Absent)
Response (verbal) to single- or non-matching pair
Criterion fail Miss or hand error to ﬁrst two single-matching pairs
OR Miss to ﬁnal single-matching pair
OR Three or more false positives
OR Critical error
Reaction time Time taken (ms) to respond to single-matching pair
Note. All motor responses weremadewith the index andmiddle ﬁngers of the right hand.
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tion and g by comparing performance–g correlations (as well as perfor-
mance scores) between a task that requires the inhibition of a prepotent
response (termed RI Present) and a task that requires an alternative,
rather than an inhibited, response (termed RI Absent) in older partici-
pants. In Experiment 2 we determine whether performance on the RI
Present task replicates in a younger group of participants. In Experiment
3 we examine the importance of task complexity (vs. response inhibi-
tion) in performance and performance–g correlations by manipulating
the number of task demands in RI Present and RI Absent conditions. In
Experiment 4 we explore the importance of task modelling in g by di-
rectly comparing performance–g correlations on the original RI Present
task across blocks of trials inwhich frames requiring response inhibition
are either present or absent. In this ﬁnal experimentwe also explore the
sensitivity, to task performance and g, of the form inwhich task rules are
presented to participants; speciﬁcally, the same task information is pre-
sented either as a set of two rules or a set of four rules in order to clarify
the relationship between WM load, task performance and g within the
context of a task in which the real time execution demands are held
constant.
2. Experiment 1: response inhibition versus no response inhibition
In Experiment 1 we examined risk factors for the recruitment of g in
task performance. We kept the complexity of task instructions constant
and focused on real-time processing demands. Pairs of coloured shapes
matching on zero (neither colour nor shape), one (colour or shape), or
two (colour and shape) dimensions were rapidly presented on a com-
puter screen (see Fig. 1). One group of participants—the RI Present
group—were required tomake one of twokey press responses (a “go” re-
sponse) to single-matching pairs on the basis of whether the left or the
right shape contained a tick, but to suppress a response (“no-go”) to
double-matching pairs (and to also ignore neutral non-matching
pairs). Single-matching pairs were presented with higher frequency
(30%) than double-matching pairs (7.5%). Therefore, a go response was
the dominant response to items matching in colour and items matching
in shape; itemsmatching in both colour and shape encompass two active
response tendencies which must be inhibited for correct performance.
Another group of participants—the RI Absent group—completed an al-
most identical task which differed only in the type of response made to
double-matching pairs. The response inhibition demand was removed
for this group; instead, participants were required to press the relevant
key (left or right) and produce a verbal response. The complexity of
this task—participants need to decide if items match, on how many di-
mensions, and on which side a response should be made—is arguably
greater than the stop-signal (Friedman et al., 2006; Salthouse et al.,
2003) and go/no-go (Redick et al., 2011, simple version) tasks that
have previously been reported to show no link between ﬂuid intelli-
gence and behavioural or motoric type inhibition. We predicted, albeit
tentatively, that the task that contained response inhibition require-
ments, and the speciﬁc task items requiring response inhibition (critical
errors, see Table 1), would be more sensitive to variations in ﬂuid
intelligence.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Sixty-nine neurologically healthy adults, aged between 57 and
72 years, were recruited from the MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences
Unit panel of volunteers. The RI Present group comprised 38 adults
(15 males, 23 females) aged between 57 and 71 years (M = 63.8,
SD= 4.6). The RI Absent group comprised 31 adults (10 males, 21 fe-
males) aged between 58 and 72 years (M = 65.1, SD = 4.8). Culture
Fair error (max = 46) was equivalent across the RI Present (M =
17.71, SD = 6.35) and RI Absent (M = 16.74, SD = 6.31) groups,
t(67) = 0.63, p = 0.529, d = 0.153. All participants gave informedconsent and were paid to participate. Our primary reason for sampling
from an older group of adultswas due towell-established evidence sug-
gesting that cognitive abilities decline (e.g., Hasher, 1997; Rabbitt, 1993;
Table 2
Performance scores (A, upper panel) and correlation with g (B, lower panel) across RI
Present and RI Absent groups in Experiment 1.
A RI Present
(n= 38)
RI Absent
(n= 31)
Comparison across
groups
Performance ANCOVA
M SD M SD F(1, 66) p ɳp2
Critical error 0.65 0.25 0.34 0.34 18.51 b0.001 0.219
Criterion fail 0.66 0.20 0.53 0.29 4.82 0.032 0.068
Miss 0.26 0.15 0.20 0.15 2.16 0.146 0.032
Hand error 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.11 4.46 0.038 0.063
False positivek 0.08 0.18 0.02 0.03 2.81 0.098 0.041
False positivev – – 2.71 1.75 – – –
Reaction time (ms) 1201 187 1168 222 0.21 0.648 0.003
B Correlation with g Fisher's z-test
r(36) p r(29) p z(67) p
Critical error 0.56 b0.001 0.00 0.999 2.50 0.012
Criterion fail 0.76 b0.001 0.27 0.142 2.84 0.005
Miss 0.52 b0.001 0.38 0.035 0.70 0.484
Hand error 0.40 0.013 0.27 0.142 0.58 0.562
False positivek 0.48 0.002 0.05 0.789 1.87 0.062
False positivev – 0.27 0.142 – –
Reaction time (ms) 0.24 0.147 0.48 0.006 1.10 0.271
115E.L. Carroll, P. Bright / Acta Psychologica 170 (2016) 112–126Salthouse, 1992) and become more variable (e.g., Morse, 1993; Rabbitt,
1993) in later years. Accordingly, older adult performancewas assumed
to be more sensitive to the demands imposed by the task.
2.1.2. Tasks and procedure
2.1.2.1. Test of ‘g’: culture fair. Participants ﬁrst completed Cattell's Test of
‘g’: Culture Fair, Scale 2, Form A (Cattell, 1971; Cattell & Cattell, 1973;
hereafter termed the Culture Fair). The Culture Fair loads highly onto g
at r = 0.81 and comprises four subtests that measure novel problem-
solving ability using geometrical ﬁgures in a set amount of time: series
completions, classiﬁcations, matrices, and topological relations.
2.1.2.2. Colour-shape match task. After completing the Culture Fair, par-
ticipants performed the colour-shape match task, programmed using
PsyScope software (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993). This
task has previously been employed, in slightly modiﬁed form, by
Duncan et al. (2008). Pairs of coloured outline shapes, one containing
a tick in the centre and the other containing a cross, were presented in
the centre of a high resolution colourmonitor with awhite screen back-
ground. Objects varied along two dimensions: colour (red, blue, green)
and shape (circle, square, triangle). Across pairs, all combinations of col-
our and shape were possible. Each object was 12.7 mm × 12.7 mm and
the distance between objects in a pair was 7.4 mm edge to edge; partic-
ipants sat comfortably and viewed these stimuli without precise control
of viewing distance (approximately 0.5m). Pairswere amixture of non-
matching (objects of different colour and shape), single-matching (ob-
jects of same colour or shape), and double-matching (objects of same
colour and shape). In each trial, READYwas presented on screen, follow-
ed by a blank-screen interval of 1500 ms, followed by 10 pairs which
were presented for 1200 ms each with a 200 ms blank-screen interval
between each pair (see Fig. 1). Of the 10 pairs, three were single-
matching, which were always two of the ﬁrst ﬁve frames (with at
least one non-matching pair in between) and the ninth or 10th frame,
one was double-matching (in 75% of trials), which was always the sev-
enth frame, and the others were non-matching. Altogether, there were
12 trials of 10 pairs. For the purpose of design, the 12 trials were split
into three sub-blocks of four trials. In each sub-block, one trial had
only colour-single-matching pairs, one trial had only shape-single-
matching pairs, and two trials had a mixture of colour- and shape-
single-matching pairs. Additionally, one trial required only left re-
sponses, one trial required only right responses, and two trials required
a mixture of left and right responses. A double-matching pair was pres-
ent in three of the four trials in each sub-block. Replication of the same
stimulus pairs was restricted and did not occur within trials or sub-
blocks.
The task required identiﬁcation of pairs of items that shared the
same colour or the same shape. If an itempairmatched on either dimen-
sion, the participant was to respond by pressing one of two response
keys (with their right hand), contingent upon the position of the tick
(left or right). Participants were then informed that, towards the end
of each trial, they might see an item pair that matched in both colour
and shape. The RI Present group was instructed to ignore these
double-matching frames whereas the RI Absent group was instructed
to say “double” out loud in addition to pressing the appropriate re-
sponse key. All key presses were recorded in PsyScope and were attrib-
uted to a frame if they occurred within 2800 ms (two complete frames
plus intervals) of its onset. The participants were not informed of this
time limit but simply that they were to respond as quickly but as accu-
rately as possible. Participants initiallywent through an example trial on
paper with the experimenter and then completed a practice trial. They
were then asked to repeat the rules and to answer a series of questions
(e.g., “what do you do if both items of a pair share both colour and
shape?”). If the ruleswere recalled or the questions answered incorrect-
ly, the rules were repeated and the practice trial re-run. After comple-
tion of the task, participants were asked to repeat the task rules.2.1.3. Design
Performance measures for the colour-shapematch task are present-
ed in Table 1. Key measures on the task were criterion fails, which took
into account performance across task elements and were considered a
measure of overall success on a trial, critical error (RI Present), which
was the ‘no-go’ measure due to its reliance on response inhibition, and
misses, which was the ‘go’ measure. The other measures presented in
Table 1 have been included to illustrate performance across the full
range of task components, but our primary focus here is on critical er-
rors and criterion fails. All measureswere recorded as error as a propor-
tion of all possible instances, except for false positivesv which were
recorded as raw values. All analyses were based on the full dataset
(i.e., all 12 trials rather than separately by sub-block). Culture Fair raw
error scoreswere correlatedwith each performancemeasure separately
for the RI Absent and RI Present groups. Performance scores and corre-
lations between those scores and Culture Fair error were compared
across groups. The speciﬁc sequencing of trials varied pseudo randomly
and was maintained for all participants in order to hold the level of re-
sponse prepotency constant.
2.2. Results
Table 2 presents performance scores (upper panel) and correlations
with g (as estimated by Culture Fair; lower panel). Analysis of covari-
ance (ANCOVA; controlling for Culture Fair error) revealed that perfor-
mance was signiﬁcantly worse in the RI Present group relative to the RI
Absent group for critical errors (response to double-matching ‘no-go’
pairs [RI Present] vs. missed response to double-matching pair [RI Ab-
sent]; p b 0.001), criterion fails (overall success on a trial; p = 0.032)
and hand errors (response to the incorrect side of single-matching
pair; p= 0.038). There was no signiﬁcant difference across RI Present
and RI Absent groups for misses (missed response to single-matching
‘go’ pair), false positives (response to non-matching ‘neutral’ pair), or
reaction time (p ≥ 0.1 for all comparisons). Although therewas a general
trend for reduced error and faster response time as participants
progressed through the task, once a requirement had been satisﬁed par-
ticipants commonly produced error on that requirement on later trials –
and this was particularly the case for the critical double-matching
frames requiring no response. Twenty-nine of the 38 participants in
the RI Present group (76%) produced a critical error in trial 1, with this
ﬁgure reducing to 19 (50%) on the ﬁnal double-matching frame (trial
11).
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signiﬁcantly correlated with g (as estimated by Culture Fair raw error
scores) in the RI Present group, but only the miss–g and reaction
time–g correlations reached signiﬁcance in the RI Absent group. Fisher's
z-test of difference for independent correlations revealed that the corre-
lation with g was signiﬁcantly stronger in the RI Present group relative
to the RI Absent group for critical errors, z(67) = 2.50, p = 0.012,
with r(RI Absent) outside the 95% conﬁdence interval (CI) [0.27, 0.75]
for r(RI Present), calculated using Fisher's z transform. The criterion
fail–g correlation was also signiﬁcantly stronger in the RI Present
group, z(67) = 2.84, p = 0.005, with r(RI Absent) outside the 95% CI
[0.58, 0.87] for r(RI Present). Therewas no signiﬁcant difference formis-
ses, hand errors, false positives, or reaction time (p N 0.2 in all compar-
isons except hand errors which was marginal at p = 0.062). Fig. 2
demonstrates these patterns of correlation, with more than twice as
many critical errors and criterion fails in the RI Present version of the
task produced by participants N 1 SDbelow the samplemeanon theCul-
ture Fair in comparison to those N1 SD above the mean (upper panel).
The absence of a meaningful relationship between these performance
measures and Culture Fair in the RI Absent task variant is demonstrated
in the lower panel, although the two participants N 1 SD above the Cul-
ture Fair mean performed disproportionately better than the other par-
ticipants in this group. All participants correctly repeated the
instructions at the end of testing.
2.3. Discussion
The inhibition (RI Present) taskwas clearly highly demanding. Itwas
expected that difﬁculties in withholding a response to the double
matches would be observed, particularly in low g participants, but that
high g participants would be able to satisfy this requirement. In fact, vir-
tually all participants were unable to prevent a response to these stim-
uli. Nevertheless, remembering the task instructions was not difﬁcult;
there were a few, well-speciﬁed rules and no obvious element of
problem-solving. All the participants correctly repeated the task rules
once the experiment had ended, demonstrating that they did not forget
what was required of them. Moreover, participants typically reacted
verbally immediately upon producing a response to the double
matching frames, indicating that the demand to inhibit the response
was in mind but the strength of two response tendencies (i.e., colour
match and shape match) was such that the instruction was overturned
and the key inadvertently pressed. Under the considerable task de-
mands the observed behaviour emulates that sometimes described in
patients with frontal lobe damage: production of erroneous behaviour
despite simultaneous correct verbalisation of task rules (Luria, 1966,
1973).
Performance on critical double-matching items was signiﬁcantly
correlated with g when a strong response inhibition demand was re-
quired, but the relationshipwas negligiblewhen replaced by an alterna-
tive positive response. Additionally, performance across all task
constraints was more closely correlated with g when the task
encompassed the response inhibition demand, indicating that difﬁcul-
ties in resolving response conﬂicts are particularly common in individ-
uals at the lower end of the g distribution. The ﬁndings raise the
prospect that a requirement to inhibit prepotent response tendencies
may be a fundamental “risk factor” for the recruitment of g in task per-
formance. Nevertheless, because, on average, performance was better
on the RI Absent task, the difference in g-correlations across tasks may
be driven by broader issues associated with differences in overall task
difﬁculty.We address this issue in Experiment 3, following a replication
of our RI Present task in a younger group of participants.
3. Experiment 2: a replication in younger participants
Experiment 1 was conducted with older participants that, on aver-
age, scored 0.5 SDs below published adult Culture Fair norms, andthere was a comparative absence of those scoring at the high end of
the normative distribution. Variability in performance is known to in-
crease with age (Rabbitt, 1993), desirable to the extent that a broad
range of scores may be collected. A negative consequence, however, is
that different cognitive abilities may show differential sensitivities to
age (e.g., Kievit et al., 2014) and it cannot be assumed that similar pat-
terns of performancewill be observed across different age groups. In Ex-
periment 2, we therefore assessed the sensitivity of performance on the
response inhibition task to Spearman's g in a younger group of partici-
pants. It was predicted that the level of error would be lower than
that observed in Experiment 1, but performance would remain highly
correlated with Culture Fair scores.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Thirty neurologically healthy adults (7 males, 23 females), aged be-
tween 30 and 50 years (M= 40.7, SD= 6.1), were recruited from the
MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit panel of volunteers. Culture
Fair error (M=12.43 SD=5.27) was signiﬁcantly lower than in Exper-
iment 1 (RI Present), a difference of approximately 10 IQ points, using
normalised standard scores (Cattell & Cattell, 1973). All participants
gave informed consent and were paid to participate.
3.1.2. Tasks and procedure
The task instructions, procedure and performance measures were
identical to those administered to the RI Present group in Experiment 1.
3.2. Results
Performancewas signiﬁcantly better in comparison to Experiment 1
on most measures—including the key measures, that is, misses (missed
response to single-matching ‘go’ pair), critical errors (inappropriate re-
sponse to double-matching ‘no-go’ pair) and criterion fails (overall suc-
cess on a trial)—although reaction times were closely similar (Table 3,
upper panel). However, when controlling for Culture Fair error, there
was a convergence of performance across experiments such that no
comparisons reached statistical signiﬁcance (at p=0.05). Thus, the per-
formance differences between the younger (Experiment 2) and older
(Experiment 1) groups appear largely attributable to ﬂuid intelligence
(asmeasured by Culture Fair). The proportion of participants producing
a critical error on trial 1 (73%) was similar to that observed in Experi-
ment 1 (76%), although there was a steeper practice effect across trials
(only 13% of participants produced a critical error on the ﬁnal double
matching frame, compared to 50% of participants in Experiment 1).
Correlations of performance against Culture Fair were numerically
smaller than those observed in Experiment 1 (Table 3, lower panel).
Nevertheless, direct comparison of coefﬁcients across experiments
(using Fisher's z-test of difference for independent correlations) revealed
no statistically signiﬁcant differences in the strength of these correla-
tions. The correlations were signiﬁcant for critical error and criterion
fails. Fig. 3 presents a comparison of performance in younger (Experi-
ment 2) against older (Experiment 1) participants, grouped by Culture
Fair z score bins of width 0.5 SD. Despite better Culture Fair performance
(with a complete absence of participants in the lowest bin), the pattern
of performance in younger participants was similar to the older group,
with those scoring above the Culture Fairmeanproducing disproportion-
ately fewer critical errors and criterion fails than those below the mean.
3.3. Discussion
Results from Experiment 2 indicate that the sensitivity of the inhibi-
tion (RI Present) task to variations in Culture Fair performance is robust
and operates in younger, as well as older, participants. Close correspon-
dence was observed across experiments in the proportion of critical er-
rors and criterion fails produced when performance was pooled by
Fig. 2. Critical error and criterion fail in the RI Present and RI Absent groups across Culture Fair z score bins in Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard error for data within the
respective bin. The numbers in the individual columns represent number of participants in that z score bin.
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out, there were no reliable differences in level of performance between
the younger and older groups.
Theﬁndings fromExperiments 1 and 2 indicate that difﬁculties in re-
solving response conﬂict operate in the normal population, and are par-
ticularly common in individuals at the lower end of the g distribution.
However, using the criterion of errors produced, the RI Present task
was clearly more demanding than the RI Absent task, and this raises
the possibility that the strong performance–g correlations were driven
by more general demands associated with increased task difﬁculty or
complexity rather than by the demand for response inhibition. This
issue is addressed in Experiment 3.4. Experiment 3: response inhibition versus task complexity
In Experiment 3we focused on real-time processing demands, aswe
did in Experiments 1 and 2, examining the role of task complexity in the
context of response inhibition. From a limited attentional capacity per-
spective, selectively attending to one or more task demand will reduce
the capacity for attending to additional demands (e.g., Broadbent,
1958; Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Consequently, the more task con-
straints there are, the more likely it is that one of these will fail to
be selected or acted upon. In Experiment 3, therefore, we examine
whether the association of task performance with g, demonstrated
in Experiments 1 and 2, can be explained primarily on the basis of
Table 3
Performance scores (A, upper panel) and correlation with g (B, lower panel) across younger (Experiment 2) and older (Experiment 1) groups.
A Younger (n= 30) Older (n= 38) Comparison across groups
Performance ANOVA ANCOVA
M SD M SD F(1, 66) p ɳp2 F(1, 65) p ɳp2
Critical error 0.44 0.30 0.65 0.25 9.80 0.003 0.129 1.41 0.239 0.021
Criterion fail 0.46 0.20 0.66 0.20 13.99 b0.001 0.175 1.88 0.175 0.028
Miss 0.13 0.14 0.26 0.15 12.86 0.001 0.163 3.24 0.077 0.047
Hand error 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.08 8.42 0.005 0.113 1.91 0.172 0.029
False positivek 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.18 3.03 0.086 0.044 0.00 0.950 0.000
Reaction time (ms) 1180 140 1201 187 0.27 0.605 0.004 0.22 0.641 0.003
B Correlation with g Fisher's z-test
r(28) p r(36) p z(66) p
Critical error 0.46 0.014 0.56 b0.001 0.53 0.596
Criterion fail 0.54 0.003 0.76 b0.001 1.72 0.126
Miss 0.32 0.097 0.52 b0.001 0.96 0.337
Hand error 0.23 0.239 0.40 0.013 0.74 0.459
False positivek 0.18 0.359 0.48 0.002 1.33 0.184
Reaction time (ms) 0.32 0.097 0.24 0.147 0.34 0.734
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whether there is something fundamental about response inhibition
in the performance-g relationship. In order to address this issue we
manipulated the tasks such that the complexity of the RI Absent
task was increased and the complexity of the RI Present task was re-
duced. In the Simple RI Present task, the requirement to press left or
right was removed, leaving only one response key for single-
matching frames. In the Complex RI Absent task, items varied along
three dimensions: colour, shape, and shading. We predicted that al-
though the Simple RI Present task would be easier to perform than
the RI Present task of Experiments 1 and 2, sensitivity to variations
in ﬂuid intelligence would remain. We also predicted that moderate
correlations between performance and gwould be found in the Com-
plex RI Absent task, due to increased attentional demands, but that
these associations would not exceed those observed in Simple RI
Present, despite the likelihood of higher overall level of error. This
result would suggest that the role of g in task performance increases
with task complexity but that a process of action control via suppres-
sion of inappropriate response tendencies may be a fundamental risk
factor for the recruitment of g that operates relatively independently
of task complexity.Fig. 3. Critical error and criterion fail in the younger (Experiment 2) and older (Experiment 1) gr
standard error. The numbers in the individual columns represent the number of participants in4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
Participants were 36 neurologically healthy adults (7 males, 29 fe-
males) aged between 22 and 52 years (M=38.5, SD=9.5); mean Cul-
ture Fair error was 11.92 (SD = 4.87). All participants were recruited
from the MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit paid panel of volun-
teers and each participant gave informed consent.
4.1.2. Tasks and procedure
4.1.2.1. Simple RI Present colour-shape match task. The task and instruc-
tionswere identical to those administered to the RI Present group of Ex-
periment 1 with the exception that the ticks and crosses were removed
from the centre of the objects and that participants were required to
press one button for all single-matching pairs (see Fig. 4, left panel).
4.1.2.2. Complex RI Absent colour-shape match task. The task and instruc-
tions were identical to those administered to the RI Absent group of Ex-
periment 1with the following exceptions: a) the ticks and crosses in the
centre of the objects were replaced by a horizontal line which indicatedoups across Culture Fair z score bins. Charts showRI Present data only. Error bars represent
that z score bin.
Fig. 4. Representation of typical Simple RI Present and Complex RI Absent trials in the
colour-shape match task. Black, mid grey, and light grey objects are presented in blue,
red, and green, respectively. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 4
Performance scores (A, upper panel) and correlation with g (B, lower panel) for Simple RI
Present and Complex RI Absent tasks in Experiment 3.
A Simple RI Present Complex RI Absent
Performance
M SD M SD
Critical error 0.08 0.07 0.53 0.30
Critical error (trial 1) 0.28 0.45 – –
Criterion Fail 0.11 0.12 – –
Misscs 0.02 0.04 0.17 0.15
Misssh – – 0.70 0.25
Within hand error – – 0.14 0.13
Between hand error – – 0.10 0.13
False positivesk 0.004 0.01 0.03 0.11
False positivesv – – 2.14 4.86
Perfect trials – – 0.09 0.18
Neglected requirements – – 0.28 0.57
Reaction time (ms) 844 96 1258 175
B Correlation with g
r(34) p r(34) p
Critical error 0.44 0.007 0.40 0.016
Critical error (trial 1) 0.42 0.011 –
Criterion Fail 0.24 0.159 –
Misscs 0.13 0.450 0.13 0.450
Misssh – 0.47 0.004
Within hand error – 0.01 0.954
Between hand error – 0.08 0.643
False positivesk 0.02 0.908 −0.23 0.177
False positivesv – −0.08 0.643
Neglected requirements – 0.38 0.022
Reaction time (ms) 0.34 0.042 0.10 0.562
Note. Misssh = no response to colour or shape single-matching (GO) pairs; Misssh = no
response to shade single-matching pairs; False positivesk = response (key press) to non-
matching pairs; False positivesv= response (verbal) to single or non-matching pairs; n=
36.
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4 (right panel); b) pairs varied across three levels of shading (as well as
across colour and shape). In 75% of trials one pair matched in shade,
which also required a response (with the left hand) according to the po-
sition of the horizontal line. A shadematch occurred only in frames that
did not match in colour or shape. Thus, participants were required to
press the appropriate key (left or right) when items matched on colour
and/or shape andwhen itemsmatched on shade. For the 75% of trials in
which the seventh frame matched on both colour and shape, partici-
pants were required to press the relevant key and say “double” (as
was the case for the RI Absent group in Experiment 1).
Participants completed the two versions of the colour-shape match
task—Simple RI Present and Complex RI Absent—with the Culture Fair
(Scale 2, Form A) being administered in between the two task variants.
Instructions were given in the same manner as in Experiment 1, with
the removal/addition of performance requirements to reﬂect the de-
mands of these task variants. For each task, participants initially worked
through an example trial on paper with the experimenter and complet-
ed a practice trial, and were then asked to repeat the rules. If recalledincorrectly, the rules were repeated and the practice trial was re-run.
The experimental trials, therefore, did not proceed until clear under-
standing of the instructions had been demonstrated. Participants were
also asked to recall the instructions after completion of each task.
4.1.3. Design
Performance measures were the same as those in Experiment 1,
with the addition, in the Complex RI Absent task, of misssh (missed re-
sponse to single-matching items matching in shade), between hand
error (response with the wrong hand), neglected requirements (com-
plete failure to attend to one or more requirements throughout the
course of the task), and perfect trials (satisfaction of all task demands
on individual trials). False positivesv and neglected requirements were
recorded as raw values whereas the remainder of performance mea-
sureswere recorded as proportion of error. Performance scores and cor-
relations between performance scores and Culture Fair error were
compared across the Simple RI Present andComplexRI Absent tasks. Or-
dering of the two experimental tasks was counterbalanced, with half of
the participants completing the Simple RI Present task ﬁrst.
4.2. Results
Performance scores (upper panel) and correlations with g (lower
panel) are presented in Table 4. On the Simple RI Present task, error
on all measures was low, with participants on average making fewer
than one miss (missed response to single-matching ‘go’ pair), critical
error (inappropriate response to double-matching ‘no-go’ pair), or
false positive (response to non-matching ‘neutral’ pair) across all 12 tri-
als. However, over 25% of participants failed to suppress a response to
the double-matching frame in trial 1. Overall, a mean of 11% of trials
were failed. On the Complex RI Absent task, though, a substantial pro-
portion of error was found on all measures. Participants failed to re-
spond verbally to over 50% of double-matching items (critical errors)
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over one of the 12 trials was completed without error (perfect trials)
and a minority of participants showed a complete failure to attend to
one or more requirements throughout the course of the experiment
(neglected requirements). Nearly 20% of single-matching colour/shape
items were missed. Of the targets that were responded to, an incorrect
key was commonly pressed (14% with the correct hand and 10% with
the incorrect hand). False positives occurred infrequently, both in
terms of erroneous key responses and verbal responses to non-
matching items.
Correlations with g were typically lower when the RI Present task
was simpliﬁed, but remained highly signiﬁcant for critical errors despite
better performance on this measure (and all other measures). Signiﬁ-
cant correlations emerged in the Complex RI Absent task. Fig. 5 demon-
strates the trend for better performance in participants at the higher
end of the g distribution. On the Simple RI Present task, all 10 partici-
pants scoring N1 SD above the mean on the Culture Fair were able to
withhold responding to double-matching items on theﬁrst trial, where-
as of those scoring N1 SD below the population mean on the Culture
Fair, over 50% produced a critical error. The chart of criterion fails also
clearly indicates a pattern of improved performance with increasing
Culture Fair score; that this correlation did not reach signiﬁcance ap-
pears primarily due to performance in those participants in the lowest
z score bin (a correlation of r = 0.37, p = 0.044 was observed when
omitting those participants from the analysis). On the Complex RIFig. 5. Critical error and criterion fail in the simple RI Present task (upper panel) andmisses (sha
Fair z score bins in Experiment 3. Error bars represent standard error. The numbers in the indiAbsent task, neglected requirements were largely restricted to partici-
pants at the low end of the g distribution. Other signiﬁcant correlations
also emerged, including for perfect trials, as indicated in Table 4. Instruc-
tions were recalled correctly at the end of testing.
4.3. Discussion
Experiment 3 demonstrates that complexity, or the number of con-
current task demands, plays an important part in the involvement of
Spearman's g in task performance. The Simple RI Present task was asso-
ciated withmoremoderate correlationswith g thanwas foundwith the
standard RI Present task employed for Experiment 1, although the cor-
relations were more consistent with Experiment 2. This result implies
that, while the reversal demand may represent an important part of
that association, as indicated by the sensitivity of critical errors to Cul-
ture Fair performance, other factors may have a mediating inﬂuence.
The reintroduction of a relationship between error and Culture Fair in
the Complex RI Absent task suggests that the number of requirements
that must be concurrently attended to partly determines the strength
of the association. The observation that elements of performance on
an easier version of the RI Present task predicted Culture Fair scores sug-
gests that a process of action control via management of response po-
tency may be a basic process underlying g. However, involvement of g
in this type of response suppression is complicated by more general is-
sues of task complexity.de), critical error and neglected requirements in the complex RI Absent task across Culture
vidual columns represent the number of participants in that z score bin.
Table 5
Task instruction rules for Experiment 4.
Group Rule Description
Two Rule Rule 1 Respond to items that match in colour OR in shape by
pressing the side corresponding to the tick
Rule 2 Ignore items that do not match in colour or shape, and
items that match in both colour AND shape
Four Rule Rule 1 Respond to items that match in colour by pressing the
side corresponding to the tick
Rule 2 Respond to items that match in shape by pressing the
side corresponding to the tick
Rule 3 Ignore items that do not match in colour or shape
Rule 4 Ignore items that match in both colour AND shape
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the shade requirement, which was speciﬁed last. That the order of in-
structions is important in predicting which demand will be failed can-
not be stated with any certainty, as all participants received the same
order; the shade demand may simply be more difﬁcult to satisfy than
the others. However, the ﬁnding is consistent with the suggestion of a
primacy effect, whereby requirements speciﬁed early are themost like-
ly to be satisﬁed (Duncan et al., 1996). Of the various task requirements,
this was also the onemost sensitive to variations in g (although not sig-
niﬁcantly so). This ﬁnding is consistent with a reduced WMC explana-
tion for individual differences in performance.
Itemsmatching on colour and shape (in both tasks) and on shade (in
Complex RI Absent) drove the g-correlations observed in this experi-
ment, suggesting that frequency of occurrence may also be important
in determining relative success on demanding tasks. The requirement
to respond to frames matching on colour or shape was reinforced
more frequently than other demands, therefore affecting a response
bias towards these frames. In every trial, there were three frames
matching on colour or shape, with a maximum of one shade match
and one colour and shape match per trial. It is intuitive that a task de-
mand is less likely to lose control of behaviour if it is being regularly re-
inforced by stimuli matching that demand. Our ﬁndings indicate that
variability in the capacity for effectively counteracting a response bias
in line with task goals is associated with individual variability in g.
5. Experiment 4: response inhibition versus task instruction
complexity
In Experiment 4 we focus on the complexity of task instructions to
address recent claims that the total complexity of task instructions
(the “task model”), rather than real-time task execution demands, are
most closely associated with measures of Spearman's g (Dumontheil
et al., 2010; Duncan et al., 2008; Duncan et al., 2012; Roberts &
Anderson, 2014). The claims were based on a series of tasks in which
complexity was manipulated by varying the task instructions, which
could be presented as a full or a reduced set (Duncan et al. 2008). In
the full instructions condition requirements for two tasks were ex-
plained, and the participants were told that information for one of the
tasks could be temporarily discarded. In the reduced instructions condi-
tions, requirements for one task were explained, and after completion,
requirements for the second task were explained. We have applied a
different approach in which we manipulated WM load by splitting the
same executable task information into two or four distinct chunks of
information.
Participants completed the RI Present task of Experiments 1 and 2,
and an RI Absent task which was operationally identical to the RI Pres-
ent task except that double-matchingpairswere never actually present-
ed. One group of participants—the Two Rule group—were given task
instructions chunked into two rules (assumed to represent an efﬁcient
mental representation of the task), and another group—the Four Rule
group-–were given the same instructions instead chunked into four
rules (assumed to represent an inefﬁcient task representation). This ap-
proach provided the opportunity for investigating a) the importance of
response inhibition in the context of efﬁciently and inefﬁciently con-
structed task instructions (while holding the actual operative task relat-
ed information constant), and b) the effects of modelling task
requirements which are not required during actual task execution. We
predicted that performance–g correlations would be stronger for four-
rule relative to two-rule instructions, despite holding constant informa-
tion directly related to the task as well as the task execution demands
themselves. If efﬁciency of taskmodelling, rather than execution, is fun-
damental to Spearman's gwemight also expect toﬁnd evidence that re-
assembly of task rules, towards greater efﬁciency, would be restricted to
those participants at the higher end of the g distribution. If
performance–g correlations remain strong across both RI Present and
RI Absent tasks in the four-rule condition, this would bemost consistentwith the claim that task modelling rather than task execution is the
more fundamental risk factor for the recruitment of g.
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Participants
One-hundred neurologically healthy adults (37 males, 63 females),
aged between 18 and 63 years, were recruited from the Department
of Psychology, Anglia Ruskin University in Cambridge and the wider
local community. Psychology undergraduates were recruited via an
on-line study recruitment systemwhich granted course credit; commu-
nity volunteers were recruited via word-of-mouth and did not receive
any payment. None of the participants were carried over from previous
experiments. The Two Rule group comprised 50 adults (20males, 30 fe-
males) aged between 18 and 62 years (M = 30.98, SD = 12.56). The
Four Rule group comprised 50 adults (17 males, 33 females) aged be-
tween 18 and 63 years (M = 29.22, SD = 12.78). Culture Fair error
was equivalent across the Two Rule (M = 9.98, SD = 4.09) and Four
Rule (M = 11.54, SD = 5.12) groups, t(98) = 1.68, p = 0.096, d =
0.339. As in previous experiments, the sample sizes are similar to
those of studies addressing similar research questions (e.g., Duncan
et al. 2008; Roberts & Anderson, 2014).
5.1.2. Tasks and procedure
Participants completed the Culture Fair (Scale 2, Form A) followed
by the two versions of the colour-shape match task in succession. The
RI Present task variant was identical to the 12 trials of Experiment 1
(see Fig. 1); the RI Absent task variant was identical to RI Present except
theninedouble-matching frameswere replaced bynine additional non-
matching frames. The instructions of previous experiments were modi-
ﬁed here. Participants were informed that pairs of coloured objects, one
containing a tick and the other containing a cross, would be presented
one at a time in quick succession. They were informed that objects
could share either the same colour or the same shape and that towards
the end of each sequence, they might see a pair that shares both the
same colour and the same shape. Half of participants were then given
two rules to follow and the other half of participants were given four
rules to follow; essentially the information contained across rule for-
mats was the same, but was presented in the form of either two or
four chunks (see Table 5). Participants worked through an example
trial with the experimenter as in previous experiments but here there
was no practice trial. The rules were then repeated for a second time
and the participant was asked to repeat the rules (which were record-
ed). Unlike previous experiments, participants were not asked a series
of questions about the task. If parts of the ruleswere omitted, the exper-
imenter repeated the appropriate rule until the participant was able to
repeat all parts of all rules. This ensured that task instructions were ef-
fectively stored in short-term memory such that every participant
knew what to do. Immediately before each task, participants were told
that the presentation of items would be very fast, to not be surprised
at this, to just do their best, and that they would get a chance for a
short break after every 10th pair of items. Immediately after each
Table 7
Paired t-tests comparing performance scores between RI Present and RI Absent tasks (A,
upper panel) and between critical errors and other measures (B, lower panel) in Experi-
ment 4.
A Two Rule Four Rule
RI Present vs. RI Absent
t(49) p Cohen's d t(49) p Cohen's d
Criterion fail 9.75 b0.001 1.369 10.48 b 0.001 1.669
w/o critical error 4.17 b0.001 0.560 4.33 b 0.001 0.682
Miss 3.87 b0.001 0.503 4.68 b0.001 0.743
Hand error 0.92 0.362 0.238 0.32 0.750 0.177
False positivek 1.59 0.118 0.223 0.49 0.626 0.127
Reaction time (ms) 3.90 b0.001 0.563 5.32 b 0.001 0.757
B Critical error vs. other measures
t(49) p Cohen's d t(49) p Cohen's d
RI Present
Miss 4.20 b0.001 0.648 5.86 b0.001 1.095
Hand error 9.55 b0.001 1.760 10.67 b0.001 2.233
False positivek 6.84 b0.001 1.026 10.71 b0.001 1.249
RI Absent
Miss 9.66 b0.001 1.491 10.40 b0.001 1.835
Hand error 5.93 b0.001 0.708 7.94 b0.001 1.245
False positivek 8.23 b0.001 1.895 11.47 b0.001 2.231
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remembered them. Key presses were attributed to a frame if they oc-
curred within 1200 ms of its onset.
5.1.3. Design
Performance measures were again identical to Experiment 1 (RI
Present). All performance measures were recorded as proportion of
error. Performance scores and correlations between performance scores
and Culture Fair error were compared across RI Absent and RI Present
task variants and across the Two Rule and Four Rule groups. The order
of task variants was counterbalanced across participants, with half of
participants in each group completing the RI Present task ﬁrst.
5.2. Results
Performance scores were strikingly similar across the Two Rule and
Four Rule groups, as displayed in Table 6; ANCOVA showed that the only
performance measure that differed across rule groups was false posi-
tives in RI Present (response to non-matching ‘neutral’ pair; p= 0.04).
Paired t-tests (see Table 7) conﬁrmed that, in each rule group, error
was signiﬁcantly greater for critical errors than for any other measure
(excluding criterion fails, i.e., overall success on a trial; all p b 0.001, sig-
niﬁcant using the Bonferroni-corrected alpha level of p b 0.05/6 =
0.008). There was a trend for greater error and slower reaction times
in RI Present compared to RI Absent for every performance measure;
in each rule group, this effect was signiﬁcant for misses (missed re-
sponse to single-matching ‘go’ pair), reaction time, and criterion fails
(when both including and excluding critical error as a criterion for
trial failure; all p b 0.001, signiﬁcant using the Bonferroni-corrected
alpha level of p b 0.05/6= 0.008; see Table 7). The proportion of partic-
ipants failing to withhold a response to critical double-matching frames
(critical error) decreased from 32 to 15% (in Two Rule) and from 54 to
32% (in Four Rule) across the 12 trials. Again, successful inhibition did
not prevent later error on critical items; this was true for 78% of the
Two Rule group and for 80% of the Four Rule group.
Performance–g correlations across rule groups (Two Rule vs. Four
Rule) are presented in Table 8. Fisher's z-tests showed that the critical
error–g correlation was stronger in the Four Rule group, with r(Two
Rule) outside the 95% CI [0.31, 0.71] for r(Four Rule), although this dif-
ference was marginally outside the statistical threshold of p = 0.05
(p=0.051, two-tailed). The criterion fail–g correlationwas signiﬁcantly
stronger in Four Rule, with r(Two Rule) outside the 95% CI [0.45, 0.79]
for r(Four Rule). There was a trend for higher performance–g correla-
tions a) for critical errors relative to othermeasures, and b) in RI PresentTable 6
Performance scores across Two Rule and Four Rule groups in the RI Present (A, upper pan-
el) and RI Absent (B, lower panel) tasks in Experiment 4.
A Two Rule (n=
50)
Four Rule (n=
50)
Comparison across
groups
RI Present ANCOVA
M SD M SD F(1, 97) p ɳp2
Critical error 0.40 0.26 0.43 0.27 0.00 0.947 0.000
Criterion fail 0.50 0.27 0.49 0.27 1.01 0.317 0.010
w/o critical error 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.23 1.43 0.235 0.015
Miss 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.16 0.37 0.546 0.004
Hand error 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.64 0.426 0.007
False positivek 0.08 0.19 0.03 0.05 4.44 0.037 0.044
Reaction time (ms) 850 87 841 93 0.22 0.639 0.002
B RI Absent ANCOVA
M SD M SD F(1, 97) p ɳp2
Criterion fail 0.18 0.24 0.14 0.13 1.93 0.168 0.020
Miss 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.09 1.57 0.213 0.016
Hand error 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.08 1.67 0.199 0.017
False positivek 0.05 0.17 0.02 0.06 2.10 0.151 0.021
Reaction time (ms) 816 95 792 90 1.68 0.198 0.017relative to RI Absent, but only in the Four Rule group. Williams-
Hotelling t-tests revealed that the critical error–g correlation did not dif-
fer signiﬁcantly from other performance–g correlations in Two Rule (all
p N 0.1), but in Four Rule, the correlation with gwas signiﬁcantly higher
for critical errors relative to false positives in RI Present, t(47) = 2.22,
p=0.03, reaction time in RI Present, t(47)= 3.26, p=0.002, and reac-
tion time in RI Absent, t(47) = 3.15, p = 0.001. These latter two ﬁnd-
ings, however, would be expected due to negligible correlations for
response time in each block. Additionally, performance–g correlations
did not differ signiﬁcantly across RI Present and RI Absent task variants
for any measure in the Two Rule group (all p N 0.1), but the RI Present
criterion fail–g correlation was signiﬁcantly stronger in RI Present rela-
tive to RI Absent in the Four Rule group, t(47) = 2.32, p= 0.02.
Fig. 6 displays performance scores for critical errors and criterion
fails across Culture Fair z-score bins. All charts demonstrate the stronger
relationship between task performance and g in four-rule relative to
two-rule conditions, and in RI Present relative to RI Absent task variants.
For example, there was a 20% difference in critical error between lower
and higher g participants (those scoring N 1 SD below and above the
mean, respectively) in Two Rule, compared to a 34% difference in FourTable 8
Performance–g correlations across TwoRule and Four Rule groups in the RI Present (A, up-
per panel) and RI Absent (B, lower panel) tasks in Experiment 4.
A Two Rule Four Rule Comparison
across groups
RI Present Fisher's z-test
r(48) p r(48) p z(98) p
Critical error 0.20 0.164 0.54 b0.001 1.95 0.051
Criterion fail 0.30 0.034 0.65 b0.001 2.26 0.024
w/o critical error 0.22 0.125 0.54 b0.001 1.84 0.066
Miss 0.25 0.080 0.36 0.010 0.59 0.555
Hand error 0.33* 0.019 0.40 0.004 0.39 0.697
False positivek 0.14 0.332 0.17 0.238 0.15 0.881
Reaction time (ms) −0.06 0.679 0.00 0.999 −0.29 0.772
B RI Absent Fisher's z-test
r(48) p r(48) p z(98) p
Criterion fail 0.24 ,093 0.37 0.008 0.70 0.484
Miss 0.24 0.093 0.21 0.143 0.15 0.881
Hand error 0.30 0.034 0.33 0.019 0.16 0.873
False positivek 0.19 0.186 0.32 0.023 0.68 0.497
Reaction time (ms) 0.05 0.730 −0.02 0.890 0.34 0.734
Fig. 6. Critical error and criterion fail in the Two Rule and Four Rule groups across Culture Fair z score bins in Experiment 4. Error bars represent standard error. The numbers in the
individual columns represent the number of participants in that z score bin.
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(in Two Rule) and from 46 to 8% (in Four Rule) across lower and higher
g participants, respectively, in the RI Present block. We also observed
differences in the g-correlations between participants that completed
the RI Present task variant ﬁrst and participants that completed the RI
Absent task ﬁrst in the Four Rule group only. Fisher's z-test (two-tailed)
revealed that the correlation with Culture Fair error was signiﬁcantly
stronger in participants (in the Four Rule group) completing the RI Ab-
sent task ﬁrst relative to participants completing the RI Present task ﬁrst
for the following measures: critical errors, z(48) = 2.23, p b 0.05, hand
errors in RI Present, z(48)= 3.01, p b 0.01, and hand errors in RI Absent,
z(48) = 2.78, p b 0.01.
When asked to repeat the rules at the end of testing, participants
could describe what was required of them during task execution.
Some participants (Two Rule, n = 8; Four Rule, n = 19) stated the
rules in a different number of chunks than speciﬁed in their adminis-
tered task instructions. Although no signiﬁcant differences were ob-
served, Culture Fair error tended to be lower in those participants that
reconceptualised the task towards greater efﬁciency (i.e., from two
rules to one:M= 7.00 errors; or from four rules to three, two, or one:
M = 10.84) relative to participants that did not reconceptualise the
rules (Two Rule:M= 10.17 errors; Four Rule:M= 10.93).
5.3. Discussion
The results from Experiment 4 suggest that regardless of whether
task instructions were administered as two or four rules, the demand
to inhibit an inappropriate prepotent response tendency was relatively
difﬁcult. In both rule groups, accuracy for critical double-matching
items was signiﬁcantly poorer than accuracy for any other measure,
with the exception of some criterion fail measures which took into ac-
count performance across task elements. This is in linewith predictions,and with previous research showing that a) no-go trial performance is
less accurate than go trial performance (e.g., Redick et al., 2011), and
b) items speciﬁed last in instructions are more likely to be neglected
than earlier speciﬁed items (Duncan et al., 1996). However, perfor-
mance differed from the “goal neglect” reported in Duncan et al.
(1996) in which once a requirement was satisﬁed it was (usually) not
neglected again. Here, for the majority of participants successful inhibi-
tion of a response to no-go items did not prevent later critical error. Per-
formance on the task that required response inhibition was also
relatively difﬁcult for participants irrespective of how the instructions
were administered. Separately in each rule group, accuracy (misses)
and speed (reaction time) for go items and overall performance (crite-
rion fails) was signiﬁcantly poorer in RI Present relative to RI Absent.
Whether this was due to the inclusion of response inhibition demand
per se, or was the consequence of RI Present having an additional task
constraint, is unclear. Performance was so similar across rule groups
that only one of the performancemeasures (false positives) differed sig-
niﬁcantly between them.
Differences between participants given task instructions as two rules
and participants given task instructions as four rules did, however,
emerge in the correlational analyses. In linewith predictions, the correla-
tionwithCulture Fair errorwas signiﬁcantly stronger in Four Rule relative
to Two Rule for the two measures central to our hypotheses—critical er-
rors and criterion fails in RI Present—and was numerically higher for
the majority of other measures. In as much as the four rule instructions
represented a more complex set of instructions, this is supportive of
other work addressing the relationship between ﬂuid intelligence and
task complexity via manipulation of task instructions of a feature match
task. In Duncan et al. (2008; adults) and Roberts and Anderson (2014;
children) performance–g correlations were numerically stronger in the
group administered an additional task rule even though this was actually
redundant in task execution relative to the group given instructions in
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ported more error, reﬂected in a greater amount of rule neglect, in the
high-complexity instruction group. Our observation of the emergence
of statistically stronger performance–g correlations in the high-
complexity instruction group was, conversely, in the absence of poorer
performance in this group. This could be explained by methodological
differences in manipulating task instruction complexity, with both
groups in our study receiving the same task executable information, albe-
it in different formats (two or four ‘chunks’). Given this observation of
equal performance in the two- and four-rule groups, the present ﬁndings
cannot straightforwardly be explained with reference to task execution
difﬁculty per se.
We also found that response inhibition was important to recruit-
ment of g, but only under four-rule instructions. The critical error–g cor-
relation was signiﬁcant in Four Rule (and not in Two Rule, with the
difference in strength between these correlations being just short of sig-
niﬁcance at p=0.051), and was also shown to be signiﬁcantly stronger
than g-correlations for other performance measures (i.e., false positives
in RI Present and reaction time in both task variants) only in Four Rule.
The non-signiﬁcant critical error–g correlation found in our Two Rule
group supports previous work that argues against a link between re-
sponse inhibition and intelligence (e.g., Friedman et al., 2006), but the
signiﬁcant correlation in the Four Rule group supports previous work
arguing for such a relationship (e.g., Salthouse et al., 2003). This leads
us to question whether conﬂicting results in the literature concerning
the relationship between inhibition and intelligence exist, at least in
part, because the complexity of task instructions, or the load imposed
on theWMsystem by task instructions, has not been controlled. Indeed,
evidence from task switching experiments suggests that switch costs
occur when task instructions elicit task sets but not when task instruc-
tions suggest only stimulus-response associations (and also that when
task sets are known, they dominate performance relative to simple
stimulus-response mappings, Dreisbach, Goschke, & Haider, 2007). An-
other interesting observationwas that, when asked to state task rules at
the end of testing, some participants appeared to chunk task instruc-
tions into fewer or more rules than were initially speciﬁed to them at
task instructions. Further, a trend for fewer Culture Fair errors was ob-
served in those participants that stated task rules as fewer chunks,
and perhaps more efﬁciently. It is possible, however, that because par-
ticipants received no explicit instruction to impose their own order on
the task rules, other instances of reconceptualisation were not identi-
ﬁed, perhaps masking any potential signiﬁcant effects.
Differences between order groups were also observed only in the
Four Rule group. As well as other measures (hand errors in both task
variants) the correlation with Culture Fair for items requiring response
inhibition was signiﬁcantly stronger for participants completing the RI
Absent task ﬁrst. The requirement to ignore double-matching frames
was presented as a part of a rule (Rule 2) in Two Rule instructions but
in isolation (Rule 4) in Four Rule instructions. If the ability to use or ex-
ecute task rules is related to g then this ﬁndingmay be explained by the
greater ability of higher g participants to adhere to a rule that had not
previously been used for correct performance. That is, by completing
the 12 trials of RI Absent (i.e., a task not containing double-matching
items) prior to attempting RI Present, the response inhibition require-
ment had not been enforced for Absent–Present participants. In con-
trast, Present–Absent participants use, and therefore enforce, the
double-match requirement straight away. This ﬁnding suggests greater
demand for operating/executing a task rule that had not been enforced
during previous performance of the task. Roberts and Anderson (2014)
concluded that their additional unnecessary task instruction may have
increased goal neglect by disrupting the conversion of task rules into
sufﬁciently activated goal representations. Our results suggest that
real-time task experience may act to increase activation level of goal
representations via enforcement of representations that are commonly
used. Collectively, the ﬁndings of Experiment 4 suggest that the way in
which a task is cognitivelymodelled is critical to the involvement of g inperformance of that task, particularly under conditions of response con-
ﬂict. Perhaps whenWM capacity is stretched, additional recruitment of
g is required to manage the execution demands of the task.
6. General discussion
Our approach to investigating individual differences in task perfor-
mance has been driven in large part byneuropsychological observations
of mismatch between knowledge of what is required for a given goal
and the relevance of the subsequent behaviours to that goal. Dating
back at least as far as Luria's (1966) ground-breaking studies of the ef-
fects of frontal lobe damage, it is clear that ability to produce goal rele-
vant behaviour is not determined simply by the objective complexity
or difﬁculty of task execution demands. Rather than an inability to per-
form a task effectively, there is loosening of the relationship between a
given goal and the knowledge required to achieve it such that the re-
quired action(s) are simply not implemented. This phenomenon can
also be observed on tasks with multiple constraints in the normal pop-
ulation (referred to as goal neglect; Duncan et al., 1996), and is particu-
larly common in the performance of participants at the lower end of the
g distribution. Our ﬁndings, like those of Duncan and colleagues, indi-
cate that g confers an advantage at the level of goal conceptualisation
rather than (or in addition to) task execution. Thus, it is not so much
the real time processing demands of a task that drive performance–g
correlations, but the efﬁciency with which the task-relevant constraints
are modelled prior to, and perhaps remodelled during, actual
performance.
An intuitive implication of our claim is that if the components (in-
cluding response biases) inherent in a given task, however complex,
are modelled in the same way by all participants, differences in perfor-
mance would not be predicted in anymeaningful way by a participant's
relative position on the g distribution. Although it is impossible to deter-
mine (and control how) a task is modelled with absolute certainty, we
consider this to be unlikely. In our view, variability in the mental con-
struction/speciﬁcation of complex goals is a major contributory factor
distinguishing low from high g participants, but evidence for signiﬁcant
performance–g correlations in basic tasks with minimal execution de-
mands (e.g., simple reaction time and inspection time paradigms;
Grudnik & Kranzler, 2001; Jensen, 1998, 2006; Kranzler & Jensen,
1989; Sheppard & Vernon, 2008) suggests that factors associated with
real time task execution place demands on g over and above recruit-
ment associated with efﬁciency of task modelling. Nevertheless, in our
study, as in that of Duncan et al. (2008), the body of instructions rather
than the task per se appeared to drive sensitivity of performance to var-
iations in g. In the current study, the status of task modelling in this re-
lationship over more objective task characteristics is best illustrated by
the observation (in Experiment 4) that the response inhibition require-
ment showed signiﬁcantly closer sensitivity to g in the four-rule (rela-
tive to two-rule) task, despite a near identical level of error in the
tasks. In those trials incorporating response inhibition (i.e., double-
matching frames), error rates were higher on most measures of perfor-
mance (irrespective of instructions) and this was particularly true for
individuals who produced more errors on the Culture Fair. Although
this is consistent with evidence that inhibition is a primary risk factor
for recruitment of g, the correlational ﬁndings of Experiment 4 show
that the strength of this relationship is determined in large part by the
efﬁciency of task conceptualisation.
A recent study (Bhandari & Duncan, 2014) has provided evidence
against the possibility that task instructions shape themental represen-
tation of a novel task, as suggested by our ﬁndings. They found perfor-
mance to be similar in a group given instructions chunked into
distinct parts and a group given instructions in a more “interleaved”
fashion. Their investigations instead suggested that goal neglectwas de-
termined by characteristics of the performed task, with the more com-
plex sub-parts of the task (those with a greater number of task
components) more likely associated with goal neglect, particularly in
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ﬁndings as evidence for goal-directed behaviour being realised via dis-
crete “attentional episodes” characterised by a clear, focused association
between current demands of the environment and the appropriate be-
havioural response, suggesting that ﬂuid intelligence may reﬂect the
ability to convert complex requirements into “smaller more manage-
able parts” (Bhandari & Duncan, 2014, p. 29; see also Duncan, 2013).
From such a perspective we may have expected to see better perfor-
mance and lower correlation with Culture Fair scores in our four-rule
condition, with the rules more distinctly mapping a speciﬁc task event
relative to two-rule. It could be that the effects of instructions on task
modelling are observed in tasks in which distinct task events are more
easily mapped to distinct rules, such as in the feature match task
employed here (as well as Duncan et al. 2008 and Roberts &
Anderson, 2014; see also Dreisbach et al., 2007) but not in tasks in
which distinct task parts involve a number of constraints. We argue
that the contribution of g to cognitive performance may reﬂect the efﬁ-
cacy with which an inefﬁcient model can be reconceptualised towards
greater efﬁciency,with efﬁciency being deﬁned as fewer distinct chunks
(however complex), thereby releasingWMC for attentional reallocation
(rather than splitting the task intomanageable parts). Given the prelim-
inary evidence for reconceptualisation of task information observed in
our Experiment 4, we suggest that the possible link between g and the
ability to ﬂexibly manipulate and remodel constraints associated with
complex goal-directed behaviours is likely to be a valuable focus for fu-
ture investigation.
Whatever the case, we submit that models of intelligence built on
correlations with objective measures of task difﬁculty which do not in-
corporate individual differences in the way in which those tasks are
mentally represented are overlooking a fundamental role of intelli-
gence: to construct action plans and realise goals through optimal allo-
cation of resources. Participants presented with the same complex task
may not, from a cognitive perspective, be undertaking the same task.
High g confers an ability to remove redundant task information and to
chunk task relevant informationmore efﬁciently. The role during execu-
tion may relate more to monitoring task content and manipulating the
model in the direction of greater accuracy and efﬁciency. Failure to
take into account potential variability in the ways in which complex
tasks are conceptualised may thus limit the validity of theoretical infer-
ences drawnon the basis of group averaging of performance scores. Fur-
ther clariﬁcation of these and other possible explanatory variables
driving individual differences in task performance will require the in-
corporation of multiple indicators and the use of conﬁrmatory factor
analysis or structural-equation modelling.
An area demanding attention in future work is the exact mecha-
nisms by which ﬂuid intelligence and task conceptualisation are con-
nected, including explorations of potential alternative explanations
andmediating factors. This is particularly true in light of otherwork pro-
viding evidence against the notion that memory and concurrent pro-
cessing share a limited resource (e.g., Oberauer et al., 2004). For
example, constructing and remodelling task representations could rely
on processes akin to those in traditional conceptualisations of short-
term memory. Our results do not support the notion that difﬁculties in
successfully performing the experimental tasks were due to short-
term memory failures in the sense of forgotten task instructions. It is
nonetheless conceivable that the observed relationship between ﬂuid
intelligence and the way in which a task is cognitively modelled may
dissolve when short-term storage capacity is controlled (in the same
way as the relationship between ﬂuid intelligence and WM processing
factors such as attention control; e.g., Chuderski et al., 2012; Colom
et al., 2008).
A recent theoretical development of the WM model distinguishes
between declarative and procedural WM (Oberauer, 2009; Oberauer,
Souza, Druey & Gade, 2013; see also Baddeley, 2012) with the latter
serving the formation of goal-relevant stimulus-response bindings,
and the bindings themselves forming the content of a higher levelexecutive system (the bridge; Oberauer, 2009). The model provides a
framework for quickly establishing new stimulus-response associations
deﬁned by task instructions, and a ‘response focus’ necessary for setting
a given response apart from other possible competing responses within
the task set. Thus, the model incorporates inhibitory links between re-
sponse alternatives within a task set and a mechanism for excluding
task irrelevant information (i.e., unless information is held in the bridge,
candidate actions are unavailable for selection by the response focus).
While thismodel requires further development, it provides an intuitive-
ly appealing theoretical framework for advancing our understanding of
individual differences in cognitive ability. In our view, exploration of the
relationship between task performance and the capacity/functionality
of procedural WM is likely to foster important advances in this area.
In summary, the present ﬁndings indicate that the involvement of
Spearman's g in task performance is largely determined by the relation-
al complexity of individual task components, and that the level of effort
required for optimalmodelling of a task largely determines the strength
of performance–g correlations. Performance discrepancies between
high and low g individuals are likely to be greatest in earlier stages of
novel task execution when initial modelling of task constraints may be
subject to reorganisation and consolidation, with the effectiveness and
time course of model stabilisation contingent upon the complexity of
the task. Response conﬂict is an important risk factor for the engage-
ment of g because it demands a clear parsing of available but incompat-
ible responses in line with task instruction. Other constraints limit the
ability to form a stable task model, with those at the lower end of the
g distribution less able to manipulate the representation of (and rela-
tionship between) task demands in an optimal way. Future research
will require systematic exploration of individual differences in the
ways in which task instructions are initially modelled and then re-
modelled over the course of preparation for, and execution of, goal-
directed complex behaviours.Acknowledgements
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